

## Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 09USNATO157, TAKING THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL FORWARD IN STORMY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09USNATO157**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">09USNATO157</a>	<a href="#">2009-04-21 17:56</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">SECRET//NOFORN</a>	<a href="#">Mission USNATO</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4026854.ece>

VZCZCXYZ0000  
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNO #0157/01 1111756  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 211756Z APR 09  
FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2889  
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE 0215  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6325  
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 5749  
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE IMMEDIATE  
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T USNATO 000157  
NOFORN  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017  
TAGS: [NATO](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [GG](#) [RS](#)

SUBJECT: TAKING THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL FORWARD IN STORMY WEATHER

Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Alliance has made great strides in overcoming internal divisions over Russia and Europe's East leading to an emerging consensus on how to take NATO-Russia relations forward. USNATO is working with Germany and the Czech Republic on non-papers that provide a roadmap for re-engagement with Russia. We plan to circulate these non-papers prior to the April 29 NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Ambassadorial meeting with the intent of seeking approval by Ministers at the upcoming NRC Foreign Ministerial meeting (proposed for May 19). Russian pressure to cancel Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises in Georgia will test the shaky emerging consensus within the Alliance on NATO-Russia. Moreover, Russian Ambassador Rogozin may slow down or reverse Russia's stated goal of re-engagement in the NRC and seek to distort our proposals. That said, our strategic approach -- of seeking to cooperate with Russia in specific areas of common interest, while pushing back in areas where we disagree -- remains valid and serves as a basis in keeping NATO united, even when Russia seeks to pressure NATO, as it is doing with the PfP exercises. End summary.

-----  
TIMELINE TO NATO-RUSSIA MINISTERIAL  
-----

¶2. (S/NF) Allies have agreed to hold an NRC Foreign Ministerial before the June 11-12 NATO Defense Ministerial. The NATO Secretary General proposed May 19 for this ministerial in order to take advantage of the EU GARC (May 18-19) (Mission seeks Washington guidance for whether this date is acceptable to Secretary Clinton). In preparation for the Foreign Ministerial, we should re-assess what type of engagement with Russia we desire in the NRC. To this end, Post has brokered two non-papers on NRC reform with Germany (the leader of the pro-reengagement camp), and the Czech Republic (the leader of the Russia-skeptics camp). Both have been emailed to EUR/RPM. These two papers illuminate the way forward as follows:

-- An "Allied-only non-paper" establishes principles on Allied discussions of Russia and reaffirms the inter-alliance understanding on pre-coordination. We believe it will lead to the development of a more coherent NATO policy towards Russia. It is intended to put to rest fear that some Allies (e.g., Germany) would block internal discussions about Russia prior to NRC meetings.

-- An "NRC non-paper," intended for all NRC members, including Russia, seeks to set priorities (Afghanistan, disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation counter-terrorism, and counter-piracy) and restructure the NRC's committees to give greater flexibility to tackle agreed priorities.

¶3. (S/NF) NRC timeline of events:

-- by April 23 - Czech Republic, Germany, and the U.S. will circulate NRC and Allied only non-papers.

-- April 29 - NRC Ambassadors will discuss "taking the NRC forward." Czech, German and U.S. Perm Reps will present our NRC non-paper. Other Allies and Russia are also preparing non-papers for this meeting.

-- May 7 NRC Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) - canceled by Russian Military Representative Mazlov. Mazlov said today (April 21) Russia wants NRC Foreign Ministers to give political guidance to the military side before CHODs meet to discuss mil-mil relations.

-- May 19 (proposed) - NRC Foreign Ministerial - we will seek approval for the NRC non-paper from Ministers. In parallel, we will seek NAC approval of the Allied-only non-paper.

-----  
COMMENT - NRC DESIGNED TO WEATHER THE STORM  
-----

14. (S/NF) NATO needs to walk a steady line of practical cooperation with Russia where possible, while being free to raise areas of disagreement with Russia. It is especially important to maintain this line as Russia seeks to raise the pressure on NATO. Allies instinctively divide into two camps in the face of Russian pressure: the new Allies will be quick to abandon NRC re-engagement to penalize bad behavior, while the older Allies try to assuage every Russian tantrum, even if the Russian demands are unreasonable. We have worked to position the U.S. between these two groups and draw Allies closer together toward a single, consensus policy. Specifically, we are seeking to position NATO to pursue mutually beneficial cooperation without retreating from NATO's core values or shrinking in the face of Russian pressure. Russian demands to cancel PfP exercises (reported septel) are a test of the fragile consensus on NATO's nascent policy towards Russia and the East. NATO should go forward with the PfP exercises, while simultaneously advancing our re-engagement in the NRC. Though turbulent in the short-term, this combination of openness and cooperation on the one hand, and consistency and push-back on the other, offers the best chance of establishing a new, realistic NATO-Russia relationship that serves our wider, long-term interests in securing a Europe whole, free, and at peace. End Comment.

VOLKER